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Background
Farm attacks
1 appear to be a phenomenon
unique to South Africa. Although crimes such
as murder, robbery with aggravating
circumstances and rape do occur on commercial
farms elsewhere in the world, these have been
singled out for special attention in South Africa due
to the sensitivity and the scale of the issue (see
Figure 1 on page 11). Farm attacks have been
accorded the status of a ‘priority crime’. This means
that organised agriculture, representatives of the
South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and
the South African Police Service (SAPS) meet
regularly to plan, co-ordinate, execute and integrate
strategies to reduce the incidence of farm attacks. 
In an attempt to understand farm attacks, focus
group interviews and one-on-one interviews were
undertaken with investigating officers and
perpetrators respectively.2 Focus group interviews
were conducted with investigating officers in all
nine provinces. Investigators estimated that the
conviction rate for farm attacks ranged from 50% to
90% – much higher than for other violent crimes.
However, the Committee was unable to verify these
figures with statistics from the Crime Information
Analysis Centre (CIAC). Given the sparse, isolated
areas in which farm attacks are carried out one
would assume that the conviction rate for farm
attacks would be low, because victims are far from
a police station and perpetrators have enough
places to hide. 
In an attempt to determine the relative conviction
rate for similar crimes in an urban area the
Committee relied on the CIAC in the Eastern Cape
for assistance.3 The Committee requested the CIAC
to carry out a comparison between house robberies
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The information contained in this article is drawn primarily from research conducted by the Committee of
Inquiry into Farm Attacks. The mandate of this Committee was to investigate the motive for farm attacks. To
this end the Committee interviewed investigating officers, victims, offenders and prosecutors. In addition, the
agricultural unions, the South African Police Service, non-governmental organisations and the South African
National Defence Force made submissions to the Committee. The Committee found that the primary motive
for farm attacks was robbery and, more importantly, that the conviction rate was high at 90%. This article
therefore examines the investigative techniques used in the investigation of farm attacks and suggests that the
little known Tracking Unit is a significant factor in the successes achieved to date. Its past experience in
dealing with politically motivated insurgency in rural areas has proven effective in apprehending suspects.
However, these techniques have not been effective in reducing the number of attacks. This article explores
how farm attack cases have been handled by the criminal justice system.
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addition, organised agriculture was also of the
opinion that the attacks on white commercial
farmers were politically and racially motivated - the
idea being to drive white people off the farms in
order to make land available for redistribution. By
typifying the attacks in such a way, the agricultural
unions contributed to the popular perception that
farm attacks were a continuation of the armed
struggle against the apartheid state waged by
Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) and APLA. A definition of
farm attacks was drawn up (see endnote 1) as a
result of lobbying by organised agriculture, and in
1998 it was given the status of a priority crime.
Other priority crimes include crimes against women
and children, gang and taxi violence, and bank-
related crimes. The Rural Protection Plan (RPP) was
devised in response to representations to the
National Operational Co-ordinating Committee
(NOCOC)7 by organised agriculture. Once farm
attacks were given the status of a priority crime, a
subcommittee on Rural Safety was formed. This is a
subcommittee of NOCOC.8 The priority committee
on Rural Safety consists of members of the SAPS
including the Crime Information Analysis Centre
(CIAC), members of the SANDF, organised
agriculture in the form of AgriSA, and the
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). This committee
meets every Thursday to discuss the reports of farm
attacks received from the various CIAC offices
throughout the country. The members of the
committee examine each incident to determine
whether or not a particular incident can be
classified as a farm attack. 
The priority committee on Rural Safety is tasked
with the operational planning and implementation
of the RPP.9 Other functions include:
• Co-ordinating all security-related actions 
relating to rural protection;
• Identifying factors that have a negative influence 
on the safety of the farming community; and
• Distributing relevant information and providing 
feedback on the rural protection plan to all
relevant role players.10
Prioritising a crime may be the most effective way
of demonstrating political will, but in order to
combat farm attacks the following resources need to
on farms and urban areas. Due to the availability of
data and a belief that provincial trends would
probably reflect national trends, the Committee
used the Eastern Cape data. The data covered the
two-year period 2000 and 2001. In sum, the
exercise revealed that in 43% of house robberies on
farms there had been a conviction but by contrast
there was only a 6% conviction rate in the urban
areas.4 A further 53% of cases on farms were either
undetected or withdrawn and 4% ended with an
acquittal. By contrast, 92% of cases in the urban
areas were undetected or withdrawn and 2% were
acquittals.
The question that should be asked: why is the arrest
and conviction rate for farm attacks so high?
Supporting this Eastern Cape trend, investigators in
the focus groups were of the opinion that only a
small number of cases remained unsolved.
Moreover, the sentences handed down to
perpetrators were rather stiff. Research carried out
by Mistry and Dhlamini found that the sentences
handed down to perpetrators ranged from 10 years
for common robbery to 25 years for murder,
possession of illegal weapons and ammunition.5
According to the judgements handed down, none of
these sentences were reviewable. In the beginning,
the conviction rate for farm attacks may have been
low but the figure has increased to 90% in some
areas.6 The high success rate can be attributed to
three factors:
• Political will;
• Resources; and
• Investigation techniques.
Each of these factors will be discussed in more
detail in the following sections.
The political will
Organised agriculture garnered a great deal of
support from white commercial farmers and
prevailed upon government to take responsibility for
the safety and security of farmers. Consequently, in
October 1998 former President Mandela hosted a
Rural Safety Summit to address the concerns of
organised agriculture. Organised agriculture was of
the opinion that the criminal justice system was
ineffective and that perpetrators of farm attacks
were, literally, getting away with murder. In
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to be the practice in urban areas. The use of the
informer network is also a valuable source of
information in all investigations. In some areas the
investigators give priority to an incident on a farm at
the expense of other cases. In others, the investigators
are able to work equally well on violent crimes in
urban and rural areas. Once the police have been
notified of a farm attack, the forensics experts,
Tracking Unit and investigators rush to the crime
scene. The forensic experts collect evidence and the
Tracking Unit is able to determine how the suspects
entered the homestead. In addition, in examining
how the victims were attacked the forensic experts
ascertain what instruments or weapons were used.
This information points to the type of suspects the
investigators should be looking for. 
Tracking Unit
This unit is one of the most effective and invaluable
tools at the disposal of the SAPS in farm attack
investigations. It makes a major contribution to the
arrests of suspects and subsequent convictions. The
Tracking Unit is used for tracking, pursuing and
arresting suspects. It also determines how the
suspects entered the homestead and for what
purpose. These units typically have a few members
from Ovamboland in Namibia who are
internationally considered among the foremost
experts in tracking. They were used widely by the
former South African Defence Force to track down
SWAPO guerrillas in the bush war.
Even though there are courses for trackers in South
Africa, the farm investigators regard these members
of the Tracking Unit as the very best. A member of
the Tracking Unit stated that his members are able to
follow the track (spoor) of the suspects longer than
are the dog units. Moreover, they are also able to find
clues regarding the age of the tracks and the
condition of the suspects. For example, they are able
to see minute bloodstains in the sand and assess the
freshness of the tracks. In addition, the height,
weight, speed and fitness of the suspect can be
determined from his tracks. In this manner the
Tracking Unit also assists the air wing of the SAPS in
its search for the suspects. 
From 1998 to 2001 most farm attacks occurred in
Gauteng, Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and the
be mobilised and utilised:
• Commandos 
• Tracking Unit
• Air wing, Disaster Management Team 
At least two of the mechanisms mentioned above
are legacies of the past. The commandos were
established in response to guerrilla infiltration, and
MK and APLA attacks on farms. As a result of the
political transition, these commandos fell into
disuse. However, with the increasing incidence of
farm attacks, the commandos were given a new
lease of life and legitimacy. Similarly, members of
the Tracking Unit served with the SADF in the bush
war. This will be discussed in more detail below.
The marnet radio system,11 which appears to be
widely used in rural areas, is yet another example
of old war techniques. All these instruments come
from the apartheid state’s response to rural
insurgency in the 1980s. 
Investigation techniques
Due to their status as priority crimes, farm attacks
are generally investigated by a specialised unit, the
Serious and Violent Crime Unit. The members of
this unit are well-trained, seasoned investigators. 
The investigators interviewed said that they applied
the same techniques to farm attacks as they do to
other similar crimes. None of them have, however,
received any special training in respect of farm
attacks. Their expertise has been gleaned from the
number of farm attacks investigated over the last
few years. The investigators are divided into field
teams. This ensures that each investigator is utilised
to the best of his or her ability. Investigators and
station level detectives work together because the
latter are knowledgeable about local systems and
informants. In order to optimise prosecution rates
the most experienced investigator is sent to court to
give evidence. This ensures that the case is
presented in a professional manner by an articulate
investigator. The investigators work closely with the
prosecutors.
The investigators revealed that they are very
committed to their work and some are even known
to sleep at the crime scene or work throughout the
night on apprehending the suspects. This is unlikely
North West respectively. The Tracking Units are
located in three provinces, the Eastern Cape, Free
State and Limpopo: large, sparsely populated rural
areas. The Tracking Unit in Limpopo Province has
the most members, while the Eastern Cape unit only
has three. But as these provinces in fact do not
account for the highest number of farm attacks, the
question must be asked whether this can be
attributed to the existence of the Tracking Units. 
Commandos
The effectiveness of the commandos varies from
one area to the next. The commandos are tasked
with assisting the police with rural safety and
security. The commando is often made up of local
farmers who may or may not be former members of
the SANDF. They are issued with state weapons.
These commandos are often the first to receive a
call for assistance from the farmer under attack,
since farms are generally far away from police
stations. Many farmers in the rural areas are linked
to each other via a marnet radio system. The
commandos then call the police and inform them
that a crime has been committed. They set up a
roadblock and start looking for the suspects.
There are three types of commando structures in the
rural areas:
• Area-bound reaction force commando members 
• Home and Hearth protection reaction force 
commando members, and 
• House and Hearth protection commando 
members.12
Area-bound reaction force units are composed of
people who live in towns and cities.13 When there is
an emergency these members are called upon to
assist, and are issued with a uniform and rifle for
that purpose. The members of this unit are trained
with police reservists to conduct patrols,
roadblocks, follow-up operations, cordon and
search operations, and farm visits.14
Home and Hearth protection reaction force
commando members are made up of farmers,
smallholders, and their labourers. Once an incident
has been reported on a farm in the area this
commando is called. They set up roadblocks and a
search begins for the suspects. House and Hearth
protection commando members are composed in
the same manner as the Home and Hearth
protection reaction force commandos. However,
they only protect their own properties and are given
a rifle if they do not have their own. In addition to
relying on the commandos, a contingency plan has
been drawn up in some areas, using members of
the local community to assist the police. This also
contributes to the high rate of successful farm
investigations. 
In the Bushveld area of Limpopo, as well as in the
Eastern Cape, contingency plans have been drawn
up to determine what should be done at the scene
of a farm attack. The Area Co-ordinating Committee
(AOCOC) oversees these plans. In sum, a Joint
Operations Centre (JOC) is set up, and the
investigation of a farm attack is co-ordinated from
this spot. Any information emanating from the
crime must be relayed to the JOC, who then sends
it on to the relevant stakeholders. In the Bushveld
area, in addition to mobilising the Tracking Unit,
commandos and air wing, a disaster management
team is also called upon to assist. Each of the
stakeholders has a clearly defined role in the
contingency plan. Hence, there is no confusion
when the plan is put into action, and valuable time
is not lost. The plan also states who will be in
command of the investigation. 
On the 14th of February 2003 President Mbeki
announced that the commando system would be
phased out and replaced with sector policing under
the leadership of the SAPS. The reasoning behind
this was that crime prevention was not the mandate
of the SANDF, but the responsibility of the SAPS.15
The President’s announcement created a great deal
of unhappiness amongst farmers who rely upon
commandos for rural safety and security. On the 5th
of August 2003 the minister of Safety and Security
confirmed that the commandos would be phased
out over six years, but that special police units
would be established in the rural areas and that
commando members could get involved in these. 
Air wing
The air wing of the SAPS, using light aircraft, is
often called upon to support and assist the Tracking
Unit in its search for suspects. The Tracking Unit
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 6 DECEMBER 2003 10 MISTRY
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 6 DECEMBER 2003 11
relays vital information to the air wing, for instance
about the height and build of the suspects. 
Limitations to the strategy
As discussed, the three factors that have contributed
to the high conviction rates for farm attacks are
political will, investigation techniques, and
resources. It is clear that a great deal has been
invested in the investigation of farm attacks, yet
these crimes continue to increase. Figure 1 below
shows the number of farm attacks recorded by the
police since 1997.16
It would appear that old techniques from the
guerrilla war have been applied in dealing with
farm attacks. This strategy has resulted in high
conviction rates but not in a reduction in the
incidence of farm attacks. 
Firstly, the problem lies with the reactive nature of
policing farm attacks. Most of the infrastructure is
geared to the aftermath of farm attacks and not to
prevention. Secondly, even though the tracking
units in the Free State and Eastern Cape play a
major role in the success of investigations into farm
attacks, they are small entities attempting to cover
vast areas. Ideally, there should be tracking units in
each area, attached to a serious and violent crimes
unit. 
In addition, the SAPS have not actively recruited
members to the Tracking Units. Consequently, their
unique tracking skills appear to be dying out.
Training courses are held at Upington in the
Northern Cape, rather than in the areas in which
the members are based. It is important for the
Tracking Unit members to be trained in the areas in
which they are based as each unit is dealing with
different terrain. It is also necessary to regularly
update the course. Moreover, members of the
various Tracking Units should be brought together
to share expertise and experiences. 
What is needed to complement the current
strategies is a comprehensive proactive intervention
strategy. Part of the solution falls within the domain
of security on farms. Research carried out by Mistry
and Dhlamini amongst perpetrators of farm attacks
and in interviews with investigators revealed that
security measures on some farms leave a lot to be
desired.17 Many farmhouses have no burglar bars on
their windows or security gates on their doors.
Windows and doors are often left open, and in
some cases there is no fence around the homestead. 
Concluding remarks
Sector policing is being touted as a potential
solution to the reduction in incidents of farm
attacks. This would increase the visibility of the
police in rural areas that are usually isolated and
vulnerable to crime. However, a good
communication strategy is required. The police
need to ensure that they have a regular slot on local
radio stations in which they convey information on
any incidents, suspects wanted, whether or not
suspects have been arrested and the sentences
handed down to perpetrators. This may help to
reduce the incidence of crime on farms, as is the
case in the Bushveld area of Limpopo Province. 
Another important factor to consider is the role
played by farm workers. They are an integral part of
rural communities and there are known cases
where they have been used unwittingly by
perpetrators to obtain information about certain
farms. Research undertaken by the Committee
found that farm workers are secondary victims of
farm attacks, and although they may escape harm,
are most likely to suffer when farms are sold,
downsized or liquidated. None of the commandos
have integrated farm workers into their structures.
However, farm workers have a stake in the
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apprehending of perpetrators and may well be
willing to participate in rural safety and security
structures. As such, they are a significant resource in
terms of any rural safety plan and need to be
recruited more actively in this regard. 
Although the large number of farm attacks has been
dwarfed by the number of violent crimes committed
in urban areas, the prioritisation of farm attacks
means that victims are more likely to see an arrest,
and the prosecution and conviction of a perpetrator.
However, this may appear to be inequitable. In the
context of severely limited resources, any
disproportional allocation of resources to tackle any
one type of crime (no matter how politically
sensitive) can only be at the expense of other needs.
In the long run, addressing farm attacks depends on
justice not only being done to farm attackers but on
justice being done and being seen to be done with
respect to criminal behaviour at large - and this
within the context of less social and economic
injustice.
Endnotes
1 Attacks on farms and smallholdings refer to acts aimed 
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farms and smallholdings, whether with the intent to
murder, rape, rob or to inflict bodily harm. In addition,
all actions aimed at (disrupting) farming activities as a
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interaction between people – often where victims and
offenders are known to one another – are excluded
from this definition).
2 Nine focus group interviews, one in each province 
with investigating officers. On average there were
between 8 to 10 investigators in a group. Only eight
perpetrators were interviewed by the Committee
because 48 had already been interviewed in the Mistry
& Dhlamini study referred to below. 
3 In 2002 the CIAC undertook a study of house 
robberies in all nine provinces using docket analysis.
The sample size was 1000 dockets.
4 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Farm Attacks. 
p 351. July 2003. The sample size was 147 dockets for
house robberies on farms and 66 dockets in urban
areas. ‘Of those 77 had been disposed of in the
manner described’.
5  D Mistry & J Dhlamini. Perpetrators of Farm Attacks: 
An Offender Profile. Institute for Human Rights and
Criminal Justice Studies. March 2001.
6  Interview with investigators, Limpopo and Free State.
7  The role of NOCOC in general is to deal with crime 
matters at an operational level. NOCOC is comprised
of amongst others members of the SAPS headed by
Deputy National Commissioner C A Pruis and SANDF.
8  At provincial level there is POCOC, area level 
(AOCOC) and ground level (GOCOC).
9  M Schonteich & J Steinberg. Attacks on Farms and 
Smallholdings. An evaluation of the rural protection
plan. 2000. Institute for Security Studies. p 20.
10 Ibid.
11 The marnet radio system is an area network 
communication system.
12 Schonteich & Steinberg, op.cit p 21.
13  Ibid.
14  Ibid.
15  The SANDF is responsible for co-ordinating the efforts 
of the Commandos.
16 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Farm Attacks. 
July 2003.
17 Mistry & Dhlamini. op.cit p 25.
